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This  paper  explores  the  complex  relationship  between  competition  and  innovation. 
Traditional measures of competition using industry statistics are often challenged and 
found  wanting.  This  paper  distinguishes  between  three  types  of  competitive  forces: 
internal rivalry among incumbent firms in an industry, bargaining power of suppliers, 
and bargaining power of buyers. Using survey data from  2,281 Dutch firms, we apply 
new perception-based measures for these competitive forces to explore how competition 
relates to firms’ innovative intentions. We also investigate the influence of innovation 
strategy as a contingency variable. Results show that specific innovative intentions, i.e. 
to invest in product and process innovation, are related to different competitive forces. 
Process innovation is correlated with the bargaining power of suppliers, while intentions 
to  invest  in  product  innovation  are  associated  with  buyer  power.  Finally,  intended 
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Competition and innovative intentions: A study of Dutch SMEs 
 
1. Introduction 
Innovation is an important driver of economic and productivity growth and ultimately 
of the improvement in living standards. It has become an important topic for policy 
makers, researchers and practitioners. Many policy makers and researchers believe that 
competition promotes innovation. This belief has widespread consequences, as it has 
been  a  driving  force  behind  numerous  important  policy  changes,  ranging  from  the 
deregulation of numerous industries in the OECD economies to many of the economic 
reforms in Eastern Europe (Nickell, 1996). A similar belief is found among practitioners 
in  business.  Meeting  competition  is  generally  presented  as  the  prime  purpose  of 
innovation in texts aimed at managers and entrepreneurs, as reflected in titles such as 
Managing Technological Innovation: Competitive Advantage from Change (Betz, 2003) 
and Innovation: the Attacker’s Advantage (Foster, 1986).  
  Given such examples, the belief that competition and innovation are positively 
connected seems widespread. This view is in line with the initial work of Schumpeter 
(1934) on economic development, in which he suggested that innovations are sourced 
from entrepreneurs via small and/or new entering firms. Knowledge is mainly public 
knowledge and cannot be appropriated, and incumbent firms have fewer incentives to 
invest in innovation. In this hypothesis, which has become known as Schumpeter Mark 
I,  innovation  is  positively  linked  with  competition.  It  is  a  consequence  of  small, 
entrepreneurial firms challenging the status quo. 
  It should not, however, be assumed that innovation is always the best response 
to competition. A cautionary example is the avoidance of competition by making price 
agreements or the geographical cornering of markets. Strategic management literature 
has  identified  various  alternatives  in  the  context  of  deciding  how  to  respond  to 
competitive threats. Innovation is only one of these (Gatignon & Reibstein, 1997). In 
his  later  work,  Schumpeter  (1942)  put  forward  an  alternative  hypothesis  that  even 
implies a negative connection between competition and innovation. Schumpeter’s idea 
was that large firms can appropriate the main part of their innovations. This provides 
them with the incentives and opportunities to innovate again. Thus, in this hypothesis 
firms undertake innovation because they seek profitable opportunities that arise from a 
monopoly position, i.e. a lack of competition. This Schumpeter Mark II hypothesis has 
been followed and tested by many industrial organization authors (e.g. Grossman & 
Helpman, 1991; Romer, 1990).  
  Empirical evidence as to the relationship between innovation and competition is 
ambiguous. After surveying the literature on testing the Schumpeter Mark II hypothesis, 
Baldwin  and  Scott  (1987)  concluded  there  was  no  unambiguous  evidence  of  an 
important,  generally  valid,  relationship  between  competition  and  innovative  activity. 
Scott  (1993)  showed  that  once  industry  and  firm  effects  -  proxies  for  technology 
opportunities  –  have  been  taken  into  account,  the  effect  of  seller  concentration  on 
innovation  becomes  statistically  insignificant.  In  addition,  it  is  often  argued  that  a 
monopolist  has  an  incentive  to  suppress  subsequent  innovation  by  other  firms  (e.g. 
Weinberg,  1992).  In  all,  decades  after  Schumpeter’s  (1934;  1942)  initial  work  the 
relationship between competition and innovation is still under debate  (Clement, 2003). 
  One fundamental problem in the analysis of competition and innovation is that 
the former concept is rather abstract and cannot be measured directly. Conventional   6 
approaches in  industrial organization (IO) literature are dominated by models in which 
competition  is  measured  using  structural  variables  indicative  of  the  outcomes  of 
competitive  processes,  usually  including  easy  to  measure  indicators  such  as 
concentration  (e.g.  Herfindahl-Hirschmann  index,  C4-ratios),  price-cost  margins  and 
numbers  of  entrants  in  industries  (Tang,  2006).  Most  empirical  IO  studies  test  the 
Schumpeterian hypotheses with data on R&D intensity and concentration. This can, 
however,  be  criticized.  Scott  (1993),  for  example,  demonstrated  that  the  effect  of 
concentration is only a small percentage of the systematic variance in R&D intensity 
across firms. In general, traditional IO indicators give information only about results of 
competition  and  not  the  process  behind  competition  (Kemp,  Mosselman  &  van 
Witteloostuijn, 2004). Potential distinctions between various types of competition are 
usually ignored. In fact, the logic of the competitive process - the interaction between 
market parties - and how this competitive process is perceived by industry members is 
one of the major deficiencies in IO-based theories (Johnson & Hoopes, 2003). This 
implies that alternative measures of competition are needed to better understand how 
competition and innovation are related. 
  This  paper  empirically  studies  the  connection  between  firms’  innovative 
intentions  and  various  types  of  competition.  We  argue  that  both  competition  and 
innovation  have  multiple  dimensions  and  that  firms’  innovative  intentions  can  be 
associated with different competitive forces. In support of this argument we use three 
new,  firm-specific  measures  of  competition,  measured  in  a  survey  of  2,281  Dutch 
SMEs. Our measures are related to various competitive forces including internal rivalry 
i.e. competition between incumbent firms in an industry, bargaining power of suppliers 
and bargaining power of buyers. We also argue that firms’ competitive reactions are 
contingent on their internal competences and assets (cf. Gatignon & Reibstein, 1997). 
More specifically, we hypothesize that firms with a strategic focus on innovation are 
less  sensitive  to  competitive  pressures,  implying  that  the  connection  between 
competition and innovative intentions diminishes. In all, the paper gives a more fine-
grained picture of how competition and firms’ innovative intentions are related, and the 
circumstances that influence this relationship. 
  The next section discusses relevant theory and develops hypotheses. The third 
section presents our survey data and variables, including innovation and competition 
indicators.  We  also  present  some  descriptive  statistics  to  explore  differences  across 
industries  and  size  classes.  The  fourth  section  then  develops  a  range  of  logistic 
regression models to test our hypotheses. The final section, section five, concludes.  
 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
Unlike many previous studies that used indicators based on industrial statistics, this 
paper follows a relatively new line of research in industrial organization by using data 
on firms’ perceptions of their competitive environment (cf. Tang, 2006). What might be 
the value added of adding new measures of competition to the long list already available 
in  IO?  Our  central  argument  is  the  trivial  observation  that,  at  the  end  of  the  day, 
competitive decisions are made by human beings. The connection between competition 
and innovation can be better understood by incorporating insights from psychology i.e. 
entrepreneurs’  perceptions  of  competition  and  the  contingencies  that  influence  the 
connection between competition and innovation behaviour. Such a ‘humanized’ view  
of decision-making is far from new. It has in fact a long tradition in business literature, 
a classical example being the behavioural theory of the firm as developed in the 1950s   7 
and 1960s (e.g. Cyert & March, 1963) – a theory that inspired modern evolutionary 
economics  to  introduce  a  routine-driven  conception  of  the  firm  in  models  of 
competition, where satisfying - rather than maximizing  - behaviour rules firm-level 
decision-making (e.g. Nelson & Winter, 1982). Yet, in the analysis of competition and 
innovation such a view is relatively new. 
Tang (2006) argues that perception-based measures are a significant departure 
from current IO literature for three reasons. First, for a given competitive environment, 
different firms may have different perceptions about the degree of competition they 
face. Prudent managers are more likely to maintain higher levels of perceptions about 
the  degree  of  competition  and  to  undertake  innovation  efforts  against  potential 
competitors. Differences in perceptions partly explain why some firms undertake more 
innovation  activities  than  others  in  the  same  industry  in  a  given  competitive 
environment.  Second,  perception-based  measures  capture  firm-specific  competition. 
Firms,  even  in  the  same  industry,  may  produce  different  products  or  compete  in 
different product markets. Thus, the degree of firm-specific competition may not be  
measured  correctly  using  traditional  statistics  at  the  level  of  industries.  Finally, 
perception-based measures reflect not only competition from domestic markets but also 
competition from overseas markets. This is an important consideration for many Dutch 




Perception-based measures of competition can take different perspectives. Rather than 
taking a holistic view of competition (e.g. Porac & Thomas, 1994; Hodgkinson, 1997) 
we here dispose of data on various competitive forces that firms encounter in their value 
chain.  We  distinguish  between  internal  rivalry  (among  incumbent  firms  within  the 
industry), the bargaining power of suppliers and that of buyers. These forces are all part 
of Porter’s (1979) framework of competion. Initially, he listed a number of structural 
characteristics of industries that indicate intense competition, such as a high number of 
incumbent firms, low entry barriers and a high market growth rate. Such indicators do 
not,  however,  suffice  to  capture  the  nature  of  competition.  Structural  elements  of 
industries  provide  only  limited  information  as  they  indicate  only  the  outcomes  of 
competitive  processes.  Porter  (1979)  suggested  his  well-known  five  forces  as  a 
framework to analyse the nature of competition. It summarizes decades of industrial 
organisation  research  on  industries’  comperitive  intensity  in  an  easy-to-comprehend  
scheme.  We  now  elaborate  on  the  three  forces  investigated  in  this  paper:  internal 
rivalry, supplier power and buyer power. Other forces include the threat of new entrants 
and the threat of substitute products. Due to data restrictions (see section 3) these forces 
remain unexplored here. 
Rivalry among existing competitors takes the familiar form of ‘jockeying for 
position’  -  using  tactics  such  as  price  competition,  new  product  development  and 
advertising (Porter, 1979, p. 142).  Internal rivalry is the  extent to which incumbent 
firms  in  an  industry  frequently  and  vigorously  engage  in  outwardly  manifested 
competitive actions in their search for competitive advantage (Pecotich, Hattie & Low, 
1999). It is associated with a number of factors (Porter, 1979): 
•  Incumbent firms are numerous or are roughly equal in size and power.  
•  Industrial  growth  is  slow,  precipitating  fights  for  market  share  that  involve 
expansion-minded members.   8 
•  Products or services lack differentiation or switching costs (which lock-in buyers 
and protect one combatant’s customers from  being raided  by another). 
•  Fixed costs are high or the product is perishable, creating strong temptation to cut 
prices when demand slackens. 
•  Capacity is normally augmented in large increments. Such additions disrupt the 
industry’s supply-demand balance and often lead to periods of overcapacity and 
price cuts. 
•  Exit barriers are high. Exit barriers, like very specialized assets or management's 
loyalty to a particular business, keep companies competing even though they may 
be earning low or negative returns on investment. Excess capacity continues to 
exist,  and  the  profitability  of  the  healthy  competitors  suffers  as  the  sick  ones 
continue to survive .  
•  Rivals are diverse in strategies, origins, and ‘personalities’. They have different 
ideas about how to compete and continually run  into each other head-on. 
 
The bargaining power of suppliers is defined as the extent to which suppliers are able to 
exert influence and affect the firm’s profitability and general well-being (Pecotich et al., 
1999). Suppliers can exert bargaining power on participants in an industry by raising 
prices or reducing the quality of purchased goods or services. In so doing they may  
squeeze the profitability out of an industry that is unable to recover cost increases in its 
own prices. Supplier power is more likely if (Porter, 1979):  
•  The number of suppliers is limited, and more concentrated than the industry to 
which it sells. 
•  Their  products  are  unique  or  at  least  differentiated  or  suppliers  have  built  up 
switching costs (e.g. costs that buyers face  when  changing suppliers, such costs 
arising from tailor-made product specifications, heavy investments in specialized 
ancillary  equipment  or  in  learning  how  to  operate  a  suppliers’  equipment, 
connected production lines etc).  
•  Suppliers are not obliged to contend with other products for sale to the industry 
(e.g.  car  navigation  devices  nowadays  also  compete  with  mobile  phones  and 
PDA’s).  
•  Suppliers pose a credible threat of integrating forward into the industry's business.  
•  The industry is not one of the supplier group’s important customers. If the industry 
is an important customer, suppliers' fortunes will be closely  linked to those of the 
industry, and they will want to protect the industry through reasonable pricing and 
assistance in activities like R&D and lobbying. 
 
Clients’ bargaining power relates to the extent to which clients can exert influence and 
affect  the  firm’s  profitability  and  general  well-being  (Pecotich  et  al.  1999).  Like 
suppliers, customers may force down prices, demand higher quality or free services or 
play competitors off against each other - all at the expense of industry profits. Buyers 
are more powerful if (Porter, 1979): 
•  They are concentrated or purchase in large volumes. This simply raises the stakes 
to keep capacity filled. 
•  The  products  they  purchase  from  the  industry  are  standard  or  undifferentiated. 
Buyers, sure that they can always find alternative suppliers, may easily play one 
company off against another.    9 
•  Their  purchases  form  a  component  of  their  own  products  and  represent  a 
significant  fraction  of  their  costs.  Such  buyers  are  more  likely  to  shop  for  a 
favourable price and purchase selectively. 
•  Buyers  earn  low  profits.  This  creates  strong  incentives  for  lowering  their 
purchasing  costs.  Highly  profitable  buyers,  however,  are  generally  less  price 
sensitive.  
•  The industry's product is unimportant  for the quality of the buyers' products or 
services. Where the quality of the buyers' products is very much affected by the 
industry's  product,  buyers  are  generally  less  price  sensitive  (e.g.  medical 
equipment).  
•  The industry's product does not save buyers’ money. Where products or services  
pay for themselves many times over, buyers are rarely price sensitive; rather, they 
are interested in quality (e.g. investment banking, fiscal consultancy services).  
•  The buyers pose a credible threat of integrating backward to make the industry's 
product.  
 
Our research thus follows Porter’s (1979) proposition that competition not only relates 
to  the  behaviour  of  incumbent  firms,  but  also  includes  forces  in  firms’  broader 
environment. By investigating two more dimensions of competition - the bargaining 
power  of  suppliers  and  buyers  -  we  are  able  to  develop  and  test  more  detailed 
hypotheses on how various types of competition relate to firms’ innovative intentions
1.  
 
Connection with innovation 
A first, general issue to address is whether we should expect a positive or negative 
connection between competition and innovation indicators. We recall that in his initial 
work  Schumpeter  (1934)  implicitly  suggested  a  positive  relationship,  representing 
innovation  as  a  consequence  of  entrepreneurial  behaviour,  and  originating  from 
competitive  small  firms  challenging  the  status  quo.  As  discussed  above  however, 
Schumpeter’s later work (1942) predicted  that competition can also switch off firms’ 
innovative efforts. Monopoly power provides firms with better opportunities to achieve 
positive results from innovative efforts.  
  Both Schumpeterian hypotheses represent theoretical regimes i.e. they are both 
found  in  daily  business  depending  on  specific  industrial  circumstances  such  as 
concentration  and  entry  rates  (Malerba  &  Orsenigo,  1995).  In  our  current  research 
among Dutch SMEs, we hypothesize a positive connection between competition and 
firms’  innovative  intentions.  Our  data  include  only  firms  with  fewer  than  100 
employees (see next section). In the Netherlands such firms are located in environments 
which can be characterized as fragmented markets with many incumbent firms. In other 
words, the relevant market form is monopolistic competition rather than an oligopoly or 
monopoly.  In  such  environments,  incentives  to  terminate  innovative  efforts  as  a 
consequence  of  losing  monopoly  power  (from  increased  competition)  are  not  very 
likely
2.  
                                                 
1 Another argument to use Porter’s framework is that it is well-known in the world of business. 
Measurement of distinct forces (rather than a holistic competition measure) is more specific and relates 
better to respondents’ experiences. 
2 Of course, for large firms or specific industries such as manufacturers of medicines, the situation could 
be different. In section 5 we elaborate on the generalizability of our results.   10 
Once competitive forces have been identified and perceived as a threat, firms 
need to decide if and how to respond. The nature and intensity of competitive forces 
determine firms’ potential profitability and are of greatest importance in deciding how 
to act. Optimal responses are usually contingent on specific types of forces (Porter, 
1979). Here, we propose that different types of competition are connected with different 
types of innovation.  This paper focuses on the widely accepted distinction between 
innovations related to products and services and innovations related to processes (cf. 
Tidd,  Bessant  &  Pavitt,  2001).  We  propose  that  some  competitive  forces  relate  to 
intended  product  innovation  while  others  are  associated  with  intended  process 
innovation.  
  As far as  internal rivalry is concerned we primarily expect a positive connection 
with  intended  product  innovation.  When  firms  face  aggressive  moves  from  other 
incumbent firms a likely response is to differentiate one’s current products or services, 
resulting in stronger intentions to invest in product innovation. By doing so firms can 
decrease  the  risk  of  becoming    involved  in  bitter  price  wars  .  Previous  work  gives 
various  arguments  in  support  of  this  proposition.  Cabral  (2000)  argues  that  internal 
rivalry  diminishes  the  degree  of  collusive  power  between  incumbent  firms,  making 
them more eager to differentiate their offerings by developing new products or services. 
Bruins  (2006)  recently  added  that  a  large  majority  of  SMEs  prefers  a  strategy  of 
differentiation rather than offering low prices. Drawing on a descriptive survey of Dutch 
SMEs he finds that 84% prefers to be distinctive by developing new products or by 
offering extra services. Only 8% prefers a low-cost strategy, implying that most SMEs 
will try to circumvent  cutting  prices  and make  product innovation a more likely 
response.  
  A  connection  between  perceived  internal  rivalry  and  intended  process 
innovation  is  less  evident.  For  reasons  similar  to  those  mentioned  above,  process 
innovations aimed to realize cost savings in order to lower output prices will not be 
favoured by small business owners. Due to their size most SMEs have fewer options to 
invest  in  process  innovations  anyway;  small  firms’  work  processes  are  often  rather 
simple.  Indeed,  it  has  been  recognized  that  larger  firms  have  greater  incentives  to 
improve their internal processes, which in conjunction with economies of scale should 
stimulate  larger  firms  to  make  greater  efforts  towards  process  innovation  than  their 
smaller counterparts (Tang, 2006; Benavente, 2006). So 
Hypothesis  1:  Perceived  internal  rivalry  is  positively  connected  with 
firms’ intentions to invest in product innovation. 
 
For supplier power we expect a positive connection with intended process innovation. 
The bargaining power of suppliers influences the marginal costs of producing outputs 
and thereby firms’ competitive posture in their output markets (Cabral, 2000). In most 
markets customers are far from indifferent to price increases, therefore  incumbent firms 
are usually unable to compensate for supplier power by increasing their own prices 
(Porter, 1979). Because investments in new products or services are less likely - such 
initiatives would target buyers rather than suppliers - incumbent firms probably need to 
accept the restrictions that suppliers impose on them by adjusting  their processes i.e. by 
attempting  alternative  cost  savings  or  adjustments  in  their  production  processes  to 
become less dependent on their suppliers in the long run.  
  One  example is the recruitment of IT workers by Dutch firms. One decade ago 
these workers were very scarce. Dutch firms tried to circumvent this scarcity by various   11 
process innovations, including less restrictive and very creative recruitment procedures, 
investing heavily  in company training programs and employment conditions, etc. A 
few years later the IT market suffered from a severe  recession, and consequently  the 
demand  for  IT  workers  dropped  substantially  and  most  initiatives  to  deal  with  the 
scarcity were terminated (CBS, 2004).  In all, our hypothesis is   
Hypothesis  2:  Perceived  bargaining  power  of  suppliers  is  positively 
connected with firms’ intentions to invest in process innovation. 
 
For the bargaining power of buyers, our reasoning is similar to that for internal rivalry. 
Buyer  power  is  positively  correlated  with  the  demand  elasticity  (Cabral,  2000), 
implying that compared to normal buyers, powerful buyers are more sensitive to price 
differences. In the case of powerful buyers we hypothesize that firms prefer to prevent 
price cuts  by differentiating their products or services from other incumbent firms. This 
implies  that  that  investments  in  new  products  or  services  are  more  likely.  Another 
reason to hypothesize a positive connection is that firms will be willing to meet their 
customers’ wishes by developing and introducing tailor-made, specific products as long 
as  specific  boundaries  (e.g.  excessive  investments,  danger  of  discontinuity,  etc.)  are 
met. In industrial organization studies, demand factors have been frequently identified 
as an important determinant of innovation. Schmookler (1966) first formulated such 
rationale known  as the  ‘demand pull hypothesis’. Bruins  (2006) recently  found that 
Dutch  SMEs  strongly  prefer  to  meet  their  customers’  demands  by  developing  new 
products  or  offering  extra  services,  rather  than  by  lowering  their  prices.  The  latter 
response is considered as ‘poisoning’ the market and believed to create a less favourable 
business environment for the firm itself.  So 
Hypothesis  3:  Perceived  bargaining  power  of  buyers  is  positively 
connected with firms’ intentions to invest in product innovation. 
 
Interaction with innovation strategy 
As previous studies found mixed results (Clement, 2003), a positive connection between 
competition and innovation is far from default and probably contingent on other factors. 
In his early article Porter (1979) had already discussed that the nature of competitive 
responses should be contingent on firms’ internal strengths and weaknesses (p. 143). 
Any plan of action should position the firm so that its capabilities provide the best 
response  against  relevant  competitive  forces.  This  creates  opportunities  for  many 
hypotheses on specific factors that can interact with perceived competition to explain 
when  and  how  innovative  responses  are  most  likely.  An  obvious  example  is  the 
availability of innovation resources such as time, money and relevant knowledge. A 
lack of such resources would diminish the connection between any kind of competition 
and firms’ innovative intentions (cf. Gatignon & Reibstein, 1997)
3.  
This paper empirically explores the impact of one specific internal capability, 
namely  the  presence  of  an  innovation  strategy.  When  innovation  is  part  of  an 
organization’s strategy this provides direction for the activities that will be developed in 
the  future  (Tidd,  Bessant  &  Pavitt,  2001).  Such  firms  are  more  likely  to  realize 
                                                 
3 Similar hypotheses have been proposed and tested in the literature on networking and innovation. For 
example Lee, Lee and Pennings (2001) empirically demonstrated that firms’ internal capabilities (e.g., 
technological capabilities, financial resources) interact with external linkages to better predict the 
performance of technology-based ventures.   12 
innovative  outputs  (Hadjimanolis,  2000),  so  a  significant  connection  between 
innovation strategy and firms’ innovative intentions is expected.  
We  here  propose  that  innovation  strategy  is  also  an  interaction  variable  that 
influences the association between competition and firms’ innovative intentions. Firms 
with a strategic focus on innovation will be less likely to directly respond to competitive 
pressures.  If  firms  maintained  an  innovation  strategy,  the  connection  between 
competition and innovation would decrease – for two reasons. First, strategy determines 
where  firms  are  going  in  the  coming  years  and  how  they  are  going  to  get  there 
(Campbell,  Stonehouse  &  Houston,  1999).  An  innovation  strategy  stresses  that  new 
product and process development is among the overall priorities in how the organization 
will operate. The more a firm’s strategy stresses innovation as an important objective, 
the more their managers - and probably also their employees - will be inclined towards 
the initiation and implementation of innovations. Such firms will innovate anyway, no 
matter what competitive forces are applicable. Second, we stress that one major activity 
in  any  strategic  exercise  has  to  be  an  analysis  of  the  organization’s  environment, 
including  competitive  forces  (Campbell  et  al.  1999).  The  presence  of  innovation 
strategy indicates that an analysis of competition has already been made. Innovative 
responses to perceived competition will already have been discounted in the current 
strategic  planning  and  objectives  for  the  forthcoming  period,  again  leaving  fewer 
possibilities  for  a  direct  association  between  competitive  pressures  and  innovative 
intentions. We therefore hypothesize 
Hypothesis 4: The connection between internal rivalry and firms’ intentions 
to invest in product innovation is stronger when firms have no innovation 
strategy, and vice versa. 
Hypothesis 5: The connection between supplier power and firms’ intentions 
to invest in process innovation is stronger when firms have no innovation 
strategy, and vice versa. 
Hypothesis 6: The connection between buyer power and firms’ intentions to 
invest  in  product  innovation  is  stronger  when  firms  have  no  innovation 
strategy, and vice versa. 
 
3. Data 
Our data are taken from a survey conducted by EIM Business and Policy Research, a 
Dutch institute specialized in small business research. The survey commmissioned by 
the Dutch ministry of Economic Affairs, aimed to measure how SMEs organize their 
business processes. Its topics included innovation, marketing, strategy, human resource 
management,  planned  investments,  and  also  a  number  of  questions  about  perceived 
competition. The survey was motivated by the fact that the organization of business 
processes is not systematically recorded in publicly funded sources in the Netherlands - 
and certainly not for SMEs. Although the survey was not specifically executed for the 
current paper, its data are well suited  to empirically test our hypotheses.   
  The survey was carried out  in June 2006, over a period of four weeks, by means 
of computer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI). All respondents were responsible 
for day-to-day business processes i.e. the owner/entrepreneur or general manager. An 
initial sample of 5,500 firms was drawn from the entire population of SMEs in the 
Netherlands, as available from  the Chamber of Commerce. Small and medium-sized 
firms were defined as firms with no more than 100 employees (Bangma, 2005). The 
sample  was  disproportionally  stratified  across  12  industries  and  three  size  classes.   13 
Responses were obtained from 2,281 persons, a response rate of 41%. Table 1 shows 
how the respondents were  distributed. 
 
Table 1. Number of respondents across type of industry and size class 
Size class: …employees  Type of industry  NACE-codes 
1-9  10-49  50-99 
Total 
Agriculture  01, 02, 05  109  50  6  165 
Low-tech manufacturing  15-22, 25-28, 34-37  236  128  29  393 
High-tech manufacturing  23, 24, 29-33  64  44  11  119 
Construction  45  99  49  9  157 
Wholesale trade  51  169  93  16  278 
Retail trade  50, 52  156  74  8  238 
Hotels, restaurants and catering  55  52  25  6  83 
Transport  60-64  120  55  20  195 
Knowledge-intensive services  72, 73, 74.2  68  44  7  119 
Other business services  70-71, other 74  198  115  29  342 
Personal services  92-93  71  38  6  115 
Financial services  65-67  44  28  5  77 
Total    1,386  743  152  2,281 
 
A  comparison  of  the  distribution  of  respondents  and  non-respondents  by  industrial 
sector  indicates  that  there  is  no  non-response  bias  present.  A  χ
2-test  between  the 
distributions reveals no significant differences at the 5% level (p = 0.33). For size class 
however, responses are somewhat  selective. Medium-sized enterprises (10-49 and 50-
99 employees) were less willing to participate compared to entrepreneurs in smaller 
enterprises (p(χ
2) = 0.01). This is not surprising as small businesses are generally most 
easy to contact. As the survey was disproportionally stratified, this selectiveness is not 
considered problematic (see hereafter). A similar χ
2-test on the joint distribution for 
industrial sector and size class, as shown in table 1, appeared to be insignificant (p = 
0.07) indicating that non-responses are not a  serious problem.  
The  sampled  firms  represent  a  much  larger  group  of  small  firms  than  other 
business surveys. The Dutch version of the Community Innovation Survey for example 
excludes firms below the threshold of 10 employees (CBS, 2005). In the sample used 
here  more than 60% of the data was  collected  from such firms (=1,386/2,281). With 
regard to the relative size class distribution of sample firms however, small firms are 
still under-represented. In the reality of Dutch business small firms represent 83% of the 
population (Bangma, 2005). Larger firms had been chosen to be over-represented in 
order to enable comparisons between size classes.  
  Table  1  also  shows  that  a  majority  of  the  sample  firms  are  from  service  
industries. As in many other developed countries, the Dutch economy is increasingly 
service-based and knowledge-based. Service firms nowadays represent the majority of 
the business population (Bangma, 2005). Yet again, some industries were over-sampled 
at the expense of others. It had been decided to collect a larger share of respondents 
from  relatively  innovative  industries,  including  high-tech  manufacturing,  wholesale 
trade, transport (including telecommunications), knowledge-intensive services and other 
business  services  (including  consultancies).  These  industries  receive  most  attention 
from  policy  makers  and  are  ‘heavy  users’  of  Dutch  innovation  policy  instruments. 
Although the given stratification of the sample inevitably distorts the validity of our 
descriptive statistics and aggregated observations, we do not expect that the legitimacy 
of the causal analyses presented in the next sections has been seriously compromised.  
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Variables 
Table  2  presents  the  variables  that  we  use  to  empirically  test  our  hypotheses.  For 
innovative  intentions  we  dispose  of  two  indicators,  representing  firms’  intentions  to 
invest  in  the  development  or  implementation  of  new  products/services  (product 
innovation), and intentions to develop or implement new production processes (process 
innovation). Both questions were limited to the coming year’s intentions and had binary 
answers (yes/no). 
 
Table 2. List of variables 




Firm intends to invest in product innovation in the coming year, i.e. development 
or implementation of new products/services (yes/no) 
Intended process 
innovation 
Firm intends to invest in process innovation in the  coming year, i.e. development 
or implementation of new production processes (yes/no) 
Innovation strategy 
(IS) 
Firm has an innovation strategy, i.e. regards constant renewal of products and 
production processes as an important part of its business strategy (yes/no) 




Mean score of three items (α = 0.73, mean r = 0.47, lowest IRC = 0.51):  
• Firms in our market compete intensively, as a result of which our market share 
is threatened (totally disagree/ disagree/ neither agree nor disagree/ agree/ 
totally agree).  
• Our margins are squeezed because of aggressive marketing by our competitors 
(totally disagree/ disagree/ neither agree nor disagree/ agree/ totally agree).  
• Internal rivalry among incumbent firms in our market limits our profitability… 
(not at all/ marginally/ some extent/ large extent/ very large extent). 




Mean score of three items (α = 0.70, mean r = 0.44, lowest IRC = 0.47): 
• Our suppliers are powerful and they indeed use their power (totally disagree/ 
disagree/ neither agree nor disagree/ agree/ totally agree). 
• We need to remain loyal  to our suppliers even if they raise their prices or 
lower the quality of their products (totally disagree/ disagree/ neither agree nor 
disagree/ agree/ totally agree). 
• Bargaining power of suppliers limits our profitability… (not at all/ marginally/ 
some extent/ large extent/ very large extent). 




Mean score of three items (α = 0.77, mean r = 0.53, lowest IRC = 0.57): 
• Our buyers are in a position to negotiate our terms of delivery and prices 
(totally disagree/ disagree/ neither agree nor disagree/ agree/ totally agree). 
• Our buyers are tough negotiators (totally disagree/ disagree/ neither agree nor 
disagree/ agree/ totally agree). 
• Bargaining power of buyers limits our profitability… (not at all/ marginally/ 
some extent/ large extent/ very large extent). 
Type of industry  Dummies for 11 industries (low-tech manufacturing; high-tech manufacturing; 
construction; wholesale trade; retail trade; hotels, restaurants and catering; 
transport; knowledge-intensive services; other business services; personal 
services; financial services) with agriculture as the reference group 
Firm size  Number of employees in full-time equivalents, log transformed 
Ψ Dichotomic responses are coded as ‘yes’ = 1 and ‘no’ = 0. Responses on 5-point Likert scales are coded 
from 1 (in case of ‘totally disagree’ and 'not at all’) to 5 ('totally agree' and 'very large extent'). 
 
Both  innovation  indicators  deal  explicitly  with  intentions  rather  than  realized 
innovations. In this respect our analysis provides a more realistic view, i.e. it makes 
more sense that perceived competition is connected with innovative intentions than with 
realized innovations. Past research has repeatedly demonstrated that today’s intentions 
are  most  important  for  future  behaviour  (e.g.  Ajzen  &  Fishbein,  2005).  In  contrast,    15 
innovations  which  have  already  been  realized  relate  to  past  behaviour,  making  it 
difficult to claim that innovation is a consequence of perceived competition
4. 
Perceived competition was measured using multiple-item, Likert-type scales. As 
shown in table 2 each force was operationalized with three items. The first two items are 
statements and relate to the relevant force. Firms were asked to evaluate internal rivalry, 
supplier  power  and  buyer  power  by  indicating  their  opinions  on  five-point  scales 
(‘totally  disagree  -  totally  agree’).  Within  each  measure  a  third  item  measured  the 
perceived  impact  of  the  force  on  the  firm’s  profitability.  This  question  was  also 
answered on a five-point scale (‘not at all - to a very large extent’). All items were taken 
from the work of Kemp et al. (2004) who made the first attempt to develop a multi-
dimensional  measure  of  perceived  competition  for  application  by  statistical  offices. 
Various  reliability  statistics  were  calculated  to  assess  internal  consistency.  We 
computed Cronbach’s α, mean correlations between the items (mean r) and all item-rest 
correlations (IRCs). The last two criteria were  adopted because α tends to vary with the 
number of items in a scale (Cortina, 1993). Recommended critical values are 0.70 for α, 
0.40 for mean r, and 0.30 for any item-rest correlation (Cortina, 1993; Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham & Black, 1998). Table 2 shows that all measures satisfy these criteria and are 
sufficiently reliable. 
We also found that the three measures are distinct and reflect truly different 
aspects of competition. Using the Factor procedure in SPSS, we applied exploratory 
factor analysis with oblique rotation to explore the dimensionality of the items (cf. Hair 
et al., 1998)
5. First, pre-analysis tests for the suitability of data for factor analysis were 
computed. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure for sampling adequacy was 0.78 
and the Bartlett test of sphericity was significant at p < 0.001, indicating the data were 
suitable for factor analytic procedures. Next, exploratory factor analysis suggested three 
dimensions with eigenvalues greater than unity. After oblique rotation the anticipated 
patterns of factor loadings were found. All loadings were > 0.50 on their specific force 
(as specified in table 2). Cross-loadings were always smaller than 0.20. These results 
are not presented here due to space limitations, but they are available from the authors 
on request.   
Innovation  strategy,  the  proposed  interaction  variable,  was  measured  with  a 
single, dichotomous question indicating whether the firm regards constant renewal of 
products and production processes as an important part of its business strategy. Previous 
work  has  demonstrated  that  this  indicator  correlates  significantly  with  many  other 
innovation capability indicators (De Jong & Marsili, 2006). Finally, variables used as 
controls included industry dummies and firm size. Industry dummies are proxies for the 
organization’s larger economic environment, reflecting technological, demographic and 
socio-economic opportunities (Shane, 2003).  Industry effects have been found to be 
important in explaining variance in innovative activity (e.g. Baldwin & Scott, 1987; 
Scott, 1993). For firm size, large firms are generally perceived to be more innovative 
than small firms because large firms are more capable of financing innovation projects 
and  stand  to  gain  more  from  their  investments.  They  tend  to  be  better  at  securing 
innovation  resources,  spreading  the  risks  associated  with  innovation  projects,  and 
                                                 
4 Of course the data are still cross-sectional, so we cannot claim any causal inferences (also see section 5).  
5 Since our primary objective was to identify latent dimensions of competition (rather than data 
reduction), this is prefered over principal component analysis and orthogonal rotation (cf. Hair et al., 
1998).    16 
retaining specialized workers (Vossen, 1998; Nooteboom, 1994). For the sampled firms, 
the mean firm size is 13.3 employees in full-time equivalents, with a standard deviation 
of  17.8.  These  raw  data  were  first  log  transformed,  the  reasoning  being  that  an 
additional employee probably has a greater  impact on the innovation practices and 
intentions of smaller firms than on those of  larger ones.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 provides the means, standard deviations and correlations for the main variables 
in  our  analyses  (sector  dummies  and  firm  size  have  been  excluded  due  to  space 
restrictions).  The  share  of  SMEs  with  intentions  to  invest  in  product  innovation  is 
slightly lower than the corresponding share for process innovation. This reflects that 
small  firms  in  general  have  relatively  simple  internal  processes  with  fewer  
opportunities to benefit from process innovation .   
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of main variables (n=2,281) 
Variable  Mean  SD  1  2  3  4  5 
1 Intention for product innovation  0.56  0.50           
2 Intention for process innovation  0.46  0.50  0.30**         
3 Innovation strategy  0.54  0.50  0.42**  0.34**       
4 Internal rivalry  3.06  0.99  0.07**  0.02  0.06*     
5 Supplier power  2.72  0.96  0.03  0.07**  0.03  0.34**   
6 Buyer power  3.05  0.98  0.13**  0.11**  0.14**  0.38**  0.27** 
** p < 0.001; * p < 0.01. 
 
About half of the sampled firms maintain an innovation strategy i.e. regard innovation 
as an important aspect of their business strategy. As for the competitive forces, it seems 
that the sampled SMEs perceive more internal rivalry and buyer power than bargaining 
power of suppliers (mean scores of 3.06, 3.05 and 2.72).  
  As  we  expected  that  perceived  competition,  innovative  intentions  and  the 
presence  of  innovation  strategies  would  vary  across  industries  and  size  classes,  we 
further explored the differences between these groups of firms. Table 4 presents the 
results.  
 
Table 4. Comparison between industries and size classes 















Type of industry:               
Agriculture  165  0.41  0.43  0.44  3.05  2.82  3.38 
Low-tech 
manufacturing  393  0.55  0.46  0.54  3.00  2.80  3.10 
High-tech 
manufacturing  119  0.69  0.55  0.71  2.84  2.72  3.28 
Construction  157  0.41  0.29  0.36  3.29  2.85  3.29 
Wholesale trade  278  0.60  0.48  0.56  3.21  2.85  3.24 
Retail trade  238  0.52  0.34  0.47  3.40  3.03  2.66 
Hotels,  restaurants  and 
catering  83  0.63  0.48  0.54  2.77  2.71  2.38 
Transport  195  0.55  0.45  0.47  3.33  2.93  3.17 
Knowledge-intensive 
services  119  0.76  0.60  0.75  2.77  2.26  3.17 
Other business services  342  0.54  0.49  0.56  2.87  2.35  3.02   17 















Personal services  115  0.68  0.45  0.65  2.72  2.48  2.56 
Financial services  77  0.49  0.58  0.55  3.13  2.73  2.90 
F-value (firm size as 
control variable)     6.1**  4.3**  6.7**  10.6**  12.6**  15.6** 
Size class:               
1-9 employees  1,386  0.49  0.34  0.45  2.98  2.72  2.92 
10-49 employees  743  0.64  0.59  0.64  3.17  2.73  3.22 
50-99 employees  152  0.78  0.83  0.80  3.26  2.77  3.45 
F-value (industry as 
control variable)     22.3**  60.9**  34.9**  10.8**  0.4  19.3** 
               
Total  2,281  0.56  0.46  0.54  3.06  2.72  3.05 
** p < 0.001. 
 
 We analyzed significant differences between industries with analyses of covariance, 
drawing on the GLM procedure in SPSS. We entered log transformed firm size as a 
covariate to account for the fact that among  industries firms also differ in their size. For 
example, manufacturers are generally bigger than firms in services industries (Bangma, 
2005). Even after controlling for size we find large and significant differences. For our 
indicators on innovative intentions, we find higher than average scores for a number of 
industries, high-tech manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services being the most 
striking ones. Below average performers include agricultural, construction and retail 
firms. Similar patterns are found for innovation strategy. These findings are common 
sense; many previous studies demonstrated that these industries consist of relatively 
active and passive innovators (e.g. Tidd et al. 2001; CBS, 2005; De Jong & Marsili, 
2006).  
  Differences  in  our  competition  measures  also  show  some  plausible  results. 
Perceived internal rivalry is highest among construction, retail and transport firms. Such 
firms usually offer standardized products with low switching costs.  In addition, fixed 
costs for housing and machinery form  a large share of their total expenses. This implies 
that within these industries rivalry between incumbent firms is likely to be relatively 
intense. For supplier power we find relatively high scores for retail traders, while the 
opposite applies to knowledge-intensive and other business services and also to personal 
services. Retail traders need to participate in a  continuous  struggle with their suppliers 
(e.g.  manufacturers,  wholesale  traders)  to  negotiate  quality,  delivery  and  price 
conditions.  In  comparison,  most  service  firms  are  labour-intensive  and  not  very 
dependent on any supplier (Johne & Storey, 1998). Finally, for buyer power we find 
relatively high scores for agricultural firms, while retail firms, hotels and restaurants, 
and personal services firms do not perceive much buyer power. Large parts of the Dutch 
agricultural  sector  are  still  strongly  regulated  by  cooperative  societies  that  enforce 
production quota and collective prices to individual firms. In contrast retailers, hotels 
and restaurants and personal service providers operate on consumer markets. Most of 
their buyers are unable to negotiate or impose delivery conditions and prices, and are 
usually  unwilling even to try.   
      Significant differences between size classes were analyzed with factorial analyses of 
variance  (GLM  procedure  in  SPSS).  We  now  used  industry  dummies  as  control 
variables to account for the fact that firms in various size classes will not be uniform in   18 
their industrial distribution. In sum, significant differences are found for all variables 
except  for  supplier  power.  Table  4  confirms  that  larger  firms  defeat  their  smaller 
counterparts  in  terms  of  innovative  intentions  and  maintaining  innovation-based 
strategies. As discussed above, this is in line with previous work (e.g. Vossen, 1998). 
Larger SMEs, for example, offer broader product ranges implying that it is more likely 
that investments will be made (for at least one product) in the coming year.   
Perceived competition also varies with firm size  (table 4). Medium-sized firms 
perceive more intense competition from incumbents in their industry (mean score of 
2.98 for firms with 1-9 employees, versus 3.17 and 3.26 for medium-sized firms, p < 
0.001).  In  general,  medium-sized  firms  operate  in  relatively  concentrated  markets, 
implying that they encounter many other large firms in their environment, some of them 
even much bigger than themselves (Bangma, 2005). In such environments competitors’ 
behaviour is generally better visible. Operating  on a larger scale also indicates that in 
all probability more standardized, undifferentiated products are sold and also that  larger 
firms may face higher sunken costs making them more committed to maintaining a 
position in their current markets. These issues all imply that internal rivalry can be 
perceived as being more severe.  
In the same way perceived buyer power is also positively correlated with firm 
size. Differences in mean scores are significant at p < 0.001 (table 4). This may be due 
to the fact that large firms tend to deliver in larger quantities, giving their buyer a better 
position  and  incentive  to  negotiate.  In  all,  innovative  intentions,  the  presence  of 
innovation strategies and perceived competition appear to differ between industries and 
size classes. Most differences  are well interpretable. For the  competitive forces, the 
differences also demonstrate that our measures are able to recover differences in the 
perceptions of competitive forces across groups of firms.  
 
4. Results 
This  section  first  sets  up  a  range  of  binary  logistic  regression  models  to  test  our 
hypotheses  on  intended  product  innovation.  Next,  similar  analyses  are  made    for 
intended process innovation.  
  Binary  logistic  regression  is  a  form  of  regression  which  is  used  when  the 
dependent is a dichotomy and the independents are of any type (Verbeek, 2004). It can 
be used to predict a dependent variable on the basis of continuous and/or categorical 
independents,  to  understand  the  impact  of  covariate  control  variables,  to  determine 
model  fit  and  to  assess  interaction  effects.  Logistic  regression  applies  maximum 
likelihood  estimation  after  transforming  the  dependent  into  a  logit  variable  (i.e.  the 
natural  log  of  the  odds  of  having  innovative  intentions  or  not).  To  examine  the 
connection between firms’  innovative intentions and perceived competition, we thus 
estimate the influence of various competitive forces on the probability that firms intend 
to invest in product and process innovation.  
  As  in OLS regression,  a major assumption is that independent variables do not 
suffer  from  multicollinearity.  Table  3  already  demonstrated  that  although  there  are 
significant correlations between some pairs, our independent variables are sufficiently 
distinct to be used separately in the analyses. Pearson correlations do not exceed 0.38. 
This implies that no independent variable shares more than 15% of the variance with 
any other.  
  The success of logistic regression can be assessed with a goodness-of-fit test 
based on the transformed loglikelihood value –2LL. It is interpreted in terms of ‘smaller   19 
is  better’.  After  adding  variables  in  subsequent  steps  (e.g.  competitive  forces)  the 
change in the transformed loglikelihood (∆-2LL) is related to ∆df (degrees of freedom) 
and tested against a χ
2-distribution (Verbeek, 2004). Other frequently-used indicators to 
evaluate the results include Wald tests (to test the significance of individual independent 
variables), the hit rate and Nagelkerke’s R
2. Neither of the last two indicators  directly 
test goodness-of-fit; the hit rate represents the percentage of correctly classified cases on 
the dependent variable. It indicates whether  additional independent variables enable a 
better prediction of the binary dependent i.e. firms’ innovative intentions
6. Nagelkerke’s 
R
2 is a pseudo R
2-statistic with a theoretical maximum of 1.0, indicating the strength of 
association in the overall model.  
 
Models of intended product innovation 
To test hypotheses 1, 3, 4 and 6 we conducted a range of binary logistic regressions 
with intended product innovation as the dependent variable. These analyses were make  
with  the  logistic  regression  command  in  SPSS  and  included  five  models  in  which 
various independent variables were subsequently entered: 
−  Model  I  was  an  empty  model  (intercept  only)  to  obtain  baseline  values  for  the 
transformed loglikelihood value (-2LL) and the hit rate. 
−  Model  II  included  all  control  variables  as  independent  variables:  industry  
dummies, log transformed firm size and the presence of an innovation strategy. 
−  Model III added measures for the three competitive forces: internal rivalry, supplier 
power and buyer power. This model provides a test of hypotheses 1 and 3. 
−  Model  IV  added  an  interaction  term  between  innovation  strategy  and  internal 
rivalry. This model provides a test of hypothesis 4. 
−  Model V added the interaction between innovation strategy and buyer power. This 
model tests hypothesis 6. 
 
Our competition measures were first rescaled into centered scores and then entered into 
the equations.  Interaction terms were computed by taking the product of innovation 
strategy and this mean centered competitive force. The significance of interactions can 
be derived from the regression coefficients of these terms, after the main effects of 
separate independents have been  partialed out (cf. Aiken & West, 1991). 
  Table  5  shows  the  results.  Without  independent  variables  the  transformed 
loglikelihood value is 3,128.10. In addition, 56.1% of the sampled firms is classified 
correctly. This is equal to the share of firms with intentions to invest in new products or 
services in the coming year, as reported in table 3. 
 
Table 5. Binary logistic regression models of intended product innovation (n=2,281) 
  Models 
  I  II  III  IV  V 
Parameter estimates:           
Constant    -1.62**  -1.62**  -1.60**  -1.62** 
Industry: low-tech manufacturing    0.46^  0.52^  0.52^  0.52^ 
Industry: high-tech manufacturing    0.75*  0.82*  0.81*  0.82* 
Industry: construction    0.11  0.11  0.10  0.11 
Industry: wholesale trade    0.68*  0.70*  0.68*  0.70* 
                                                 
6 The hit rate cannot be used as goodness-of-fit measure because it ignores actual predicted probabilities 
and instead uses dichotomized predictions based on a cutoff (Verbeek, 2004).   20 
  Models 
  I  II  III  IV  V 
Industry: retail trade    0.44  0.53^  0.51^  0.53^ 
Industry: hotels, restaurants and catering    0.86*  1.04*  1.04*  1.04* 
Industry: transport    0.57^  0.59^  0.57^  0.59^ 
Industry: knowledge-intensive services    1.19**  1.25**  1.25**  1.25** 
Industry: other business services    0.39  0.47^  0.46^  0.47^ 
Industry: personal services    0.91*  1.07**  1.06**  1.07** 
Industry: financial services    0.15  0.22  0.21  0.23 
Log firm size    0.29**  0.26**  0.26**  0.26** 
Innovation strategy (IS)    1.60**  1.57**  1.58**  1.57** 
Internal rivalry (IR)      0.07  0.17^  0.07 
Supplier power      0.00  0.00  0.00 
Buyer power (BP)      0.15^  0.14^  0.15^ 
Interaction: IS*IR        -0.20^   
Interaction: IS*BP          -0.01 
Model fit:           
-2LL  3,128.10  2,556.88  2,544.31  2,539.94  2,544.29 
∆ -2LL    571.22  12.57  4.37  0.02 
∆ df    13  3  1  1 
significance    **  *  ^   
Correctly classified cases  56.1%  71.0%  73.9%  74.4%  74.0% 
Nagelkerke R
2    0.25  0.26  0.27  0.26 
** p < 0.001; * p<0.01; ^ p<0.05. 
 
Model II adds our control variables to the equation. This significantly diminishes the 
transformed loglikelihood value (∆ -2LL = 571.22 with ∆df = 13, p < 0.001), implying 
that when taken together, the independents are linearly related to the log odds of firms’ 
intentions  to  invest  in  product  innovation.  The  hit  rate  increases  to  71.0%  while 
Nagelkerke’s R
2 is 0.25, suggesting a reasonable association between our controls and 
intended product innovation. Wald tests on the individual parameters confirm some of 
the differences between industries and size classes we reported on  earlier e.g. high-tech 
manufacturers  and  knowledge-intensive  service  firms  are  much  more  likely  to  have 
innovative intentions (compared to agricultural firms), and firm size is also a strong and 
positive predicator. As we expected innovation strategy also very strongly increases the 
probability of having intentions to invest in new products (b = 1.60, p < 0.001).  
  Model III provides a test of hypotheses 1 and 3 by entering measures of the 
competitive forces. Goodness-of-fit again improves significantly (∆-2LL = 12.57 with 
∆df = 3, p < 0.01) while the hit rate and Nagelkerke’s R
2 also improve. From the Wald 
tests we conclude that the bargaining power of buyers makes a significant contribution 
to the odds of having innovative intentions for product innovation (b = 0.15, p < 0.05). 
Thus, hypothesis 3 is confirmed. Besides, as we expected the parameter for supplier 
power is insignificant (b = 0.00), reflecting that firms do not invest in new products to 
cope with the bargaining power of their suppliers. Finally, we find no positive influence 
of  internal  rivalry.  The  logistic  regression  coefficient  is  positive  (b  =  0.07)  but 
insignificant, so in other words we find no direct association between competition with   21 
incumbent  firms  and  intentions  to  invest  in  product  innovation.  Hypothesis  1  is 
rejected
7. 
  Model IV tests the fourth hypothesis by entering the interaction term between 
innovation strategy and internal rivalry. The transformed log likelihood value decreases 
significantly  (∆-2LL  =  4.37  with  ∆df  =  1,  p  <  0.05).  Wald  tests  on  the  individual 
parameters reveal a negative sign for the interaction term (b = -0.20, p < 0.05). To 
further  analyze  the  significant  interaction  effect,  the  regression  equation  can  be 
rearranged in simple regressions given conditional values of innovation strategy. By 
evaluating  the  parameter  estimates  in  case  an  innovation  strategy  is  present  (versus 
lacking),  different  parameters  estimates  are  obtained  for  the  connection  between 
perceived  internal  rivalry  and  intentions  for  product  innovation  (cf.  Aiken  &  West, 
1991). It appears that if firms do not maintain an innovation strategy (value = 0), the 
parameter estimate of internal rivalry is positive and significant (b = 0.17, p < 0.05). In 
contrast,  if  firms  do  maintain  an  innovation  strategy  (value  =  1)  the  estimated 
coefficient becomes insignificant (b = -0.03, p > 0.05). So in all the connection between 
internal  rivalry  and  firms’  intentions  for  product  innovation  is  moderated  by  the 
presence of an innovation strategy. A positive connection is found only if firms have no 
innovation strategy and vice versa. Hypothesis 4 is confirmed.  
  Model V provides a test of hypothesis 6 on the interaction between innovation 
strategy  and  buyer  power.  Here,  adding  the  interaction  term  does  not  improve  the 
goodness-of-fit (∆-2LL = 0.02 with ∆df = 1, p > 0.05). The hit rate and pseudo R
2 
remain  almost  identical  as  well.  Buyers’  bargaining  power  is  appararently  directly 
connected to  firms’ intentions to invest in product innovation, but no interaction effect 
is found. Hypothesis 6 is rejected. 
 
Models of intended process innovation 
An identical procedure was followed to test hypotheses 2 and 5 . We conducted four 
binary logistic regressions with intended process innovation as the dependent variable. 
Model VI was an empty model to obtain baseline values for -2LL and the hit rate. 
Model  VII  included  our  control  variables.  Model  VIII  added  our  measures  of 
competition  to  test  hypothesis  2.  Finally,  model  IX  entered  the  interaction  term  of 
innovation strategy and supplier power to test hypothesis 5. The results are presented in 
table 6.  
 
Table 6. Binary logistic regression models of intended process innovation (n=2,281) 
  Models 
  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
Parameter estimates:         
Constant    -1.71**  -1.74**  -1.74** 
Industry: low-tech manufacturing    -0.12  -0.10  -0.10 
Industry: high-tech manufacturing    -0.07  -0.07  -0.06 
Industry: construction    -0.77*  -0.76*  -0.76* 
Industry: wholesale trade    -0.03  -0.02  -0.02 
Industry: retail trade    -0.51^  -0.47^  -0.47^ 
Industry: hotels, restaurants and catering    0.01  0.05  0.04 
Industry: transport    -0.09  -0.07  -0.07 
                                                 
7 We did experiment with alternative ways to test hypotheses 1 and 3. When the competitive forces are 
entered into the equation one-by-one, results remain identical. These results are available from the authors 
on request.   22 
  Models 
  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
Industry: knowledge-intensive services    0.20  0.26  0.26 
Industry: other business services    -0.01  0.04  0.04 
Industry: personal services    -0.23  -0.16  -0.16 
Industry: financial services    0.45  0.50  0.50 
Log firm size    0.52**  0.52**  0.52** 
Innovation strategy (IS)    1.18**  1.17**  1.17** 
Internal rivalry (IR)      -0.08  -0.08 
Supplier power (SP)      0.11^  0.14^ 
Buyer power (BP)      0.05  0.05 
Interaction: IS*SP        -0.05 
Model fit:         
-2LL  3,146.78  2,637.10  2,628.59  2,628.36 
∆ -2LL    509.68  8.51  0.23 
∆ df    13  3  1 
significance    **  ^   
Correctly classified cases  54.1%  67.8%  70.5%  70.6% 
Nagelkerke R
2    0.24  0.25  0.24 
** p < 0.001; * p < 0.01; ^ p < 0.05. 
 
The empty model VI gives baseline values for the transformed loglikelihood (3,146.78) 
and  the  hit  rate  (54.1%).  This  latter  figure  is  equal  to  the  share  of  firms  with  no 
intentions to invest in process innovation in the forthcoming year. Model VII adds the 
control variables which again significantly improves model fit (∆-2LL = 509.68 with 
∆df = 13, p < 0.001). This step increases the percentage of correctly classified cases 
with  13.7%.  Nagelkerke’s  R
2  equals  0.24  indicating  a  good  strength  between  the 
independents  and  the  probability  of  firms’  intentions  for  process  innovation.  The 
significance and sizes of individual effect parameters again demonstrate that firm size 
and innovation strategy are strongly associated with this probability (b = 0.52 and b = 
1.18, both with p < 0.001).  
  Model VIII adds the three competition measures. Goodness-of-fit improves (∆-
2LL = 8.51 with ∆df = 3, p < 0.05) and the same applies to the hit rate and Nagelkerke’s 
R
2. Wald tests on the individual parameters show that only the bargaining power of 
suppliers contributes significantly to intended process innovation (b = 0.11, p < 0.05). 
Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. Besides, as we expected, the coefficients of internal rivalry 
and buyer power are insignificant
8.    
  Model IX enters the interaction term between innovation strategy and supplier 
power.  The  transformed  loglikelihood  value  is  now  almost  identical  and  far  from 
significant.  We  find  no  moderating  effect  of  innovation  strategy  on  the  connection 
between supplier power and intended process innovation, so hypothesis 5 is rejected.  
 
5. Discussion 
Using a new set of firm-specific measures this paper explored how various types of 
competition are connected with various types of innovation. Rather than using structural 
competition indicators such as concentration indices or measures of turbulence, we here 
based our exploration on perception-based measures of the competitive forces that firms 
encounter in their value chain: internal rivalry with other incumbent firms, bargaining 
                                                 
8 Entering internal rivalry, supplier power and buyer power to the equation separately gives nearly 
identical results.    23 
power of suppliers, and bargaining power of buyers. We used multiple-item, Likert-type 
measures with sufficient reliability, and well capable to retrieve plausible differences in 
perceived competition between industries and size classes. 
Compared  to  previous  work  the  results  suggest  a  more  subtle  view  of  how 
competition  and  innovation  are  related.  Drawing  on  survey  data  from  2,281  Dutch 
SMEs, buyer power appeared to be directly related  to intended product innovation. 
When confronted with powerful customers, firms apparently prefer to avoid   cutting  
prices  by  differentiating  their  products.  Within  certain  boundaries  they  will  also  be 
willing to meet their customers’ demands (‘the customer is always right’).  
For supplier power we found a direct association with firms’ intentions to invest 
in  process  innovation.  This  competitive  force  means  that  suppliers  can  enforce 
restrictions  on  the  incumbent  firm  (such  as  price  increases  or  quality  reductions) 
without being punished. Firms probably need to adapt to such behaviour by attempting 
to  achieve  alternative  cost  savings  or  adjustments  in  their  production  processes  to 
become less dependent on the supplier in the long run.  
For  internal  rivalry  we  found  a  positive  connection  with  intended  product 
innovation,  but  only  when  firms  do  not  maintain  an  innovation  strategy.  Similar  to 
buyer  power,  this  finding  suggests  that  when  firms  perceive  other  incumbents  as 
threatening, they prefer to  avoid price cuts  by developing new, differentiated products. 
However,  if  firms  maintain  an  innovation  strategy,  the  impact  of  internal  rivalry 
becomes  insignificant.  Such  firms  will  innovate  anyway,  and  rivalry  from  other 
incumbents does not alter this. Innovative intentions as a consequence of internal rivalry 
were  probably already taken into account  when the strategy was defined.  
 
Limitations 
Our findings should be interpreted with a few caveats. In the introduction section we  
discussed the Schumpeterian hypotheses, implying that competition and innovation can, 
in general, be either positively or negatively related. Here we  find some evidence for a 
positive connection, but remark that this may very well be an artifact of our survey data 
which  included  SMEs  only.  In  general  such  firms  operate  in  monopolistically 
competitive markets with many other (entrepreneurial) firms, so a positive connection 
between  competition  and  innovation  is  likely.  This  result,  however,  cannot  be 
generalized to the broader business population. In oligopolistic or monopolistic markets 
– when only a few large firms are active - the connection might in fact be negative. 
Another comment is that in terms of size, the logistic regression parameters of 
our competition measures are rather modest. As an example, we found that buyer power 
is connected with intended product innovation with b = 0.15 (table 5). This implies that 
perceived bargaining power of buyers increases the odds of intended product innovation 
by exp(0.15) = 1.16 (Verbeek, 2004)
9. We note that previous work  identified many 
possible  responses  to  perceived  competition,  including  price  reductions, 
accommodation  (e.g.  silent  cooperation  or  mergers),  ignorance  (for  instance  when 
resources to respond are lacking) or even withdrawal from current markets (Gatignon & 
Reibstein, 1997). Likewise, Chen, Smith and Grimm (1992) argue that responses may 
be ‘strategic’ versus ‘tactical’. Strategic responses include significant investments in 
fixed assets and/or people and results in major changes to structure and products. In 
                                                 
9 In comparison, maintaining an innovation strategy increases the odds of intended product innovation by 
exp(1.57) = 4.81 (see table 5, model III).   24 
contrast,  tactical  responses  do  not  involve  such  commitments  and  require  relatively 
minor, routine changes. Given that product and process innovation are only two of out 
many responses and that many competitive moves will be routine changes rather than 
innovations, modest effect sizes may, in fact, be plausible. Even so, future research 
should  explore  this  phenomenon  in  more  detail,  for  instance  by  capturing  other 
competitive forces, other objects of innovation and new interaction variables that may 
enhance the connection between competition and innovation. 
A final remark is that the survey data used for the analysis in this paper are 
cross-sectional. Despite the fact that our dependent variables were formulated in terms 
of innovative intentions, this paper is unable to deal with the two-way causality problem 
that  challenges  most  empirical  studies.  To  be  truly  convincing  on  the  subject  of 
causality, time series data and an improved research design, with a convincing source of 
exogenous variation in competitive forces, would be required. It is precisely for  this 
reason that we formulated our hypotheses in terms of associations rather than causal 
relationships. 
 
Implications and suggestions 
Notwithstanding  these  caveats,  the  evidence  presented  in  this  paper  has  important 
implications. The ‘humanized’ approach with perception-based measures has already 
been applied in other contexts of industrial organization research, but is relatively new 
in the context of competition (Kemp et al. 2004). Perception-based measures account 
for the fact that individual firms can assess competitive forces differently, and respond 
in various ways and with varied intensity, even when they are active in the same market. 
This paper has shown that such measures enable more fine-grained analyses on how 
competition and innovation are related. Various types of competition are connected with 
various innovative intentions. In addition, our results show that the connection between 
competition and innovation is not monotonously positive or negative, but contingent on 
other variables. Here we demonstrated that innovation strategy moderates the strength 
of association between internal rivalry and intended product innovation, but of course 
many other contingency variables can be proposed.  
Implications for future research are straightforward: one should continue in this 
direction by reproducing our findings in other contexts/countries, by investigating other 
competitive forces and other objects of innovation, and by proposing and testing new 
interaction variables. We repeat that we lacked data on the threat of substitute products 
and new entrants; two more competitive forces as described by Porter (1979). We can 
also easily think of other innovation objects that firms may use in their competitive 
moves, including new markets, raw materials and organizational innovations (Tidd et al. 
2001). The investigation of such forces and moves would improve our understanding  of 
the impact of competition on innovation. 
The findings also have implications for policy makers attempting to promote 
innovation by means of competition measures. For instance, the evidence suggests that 
it is important to recognize that a change in a regulatory policy may affect  various types 
of competition which, in turn, may result in various  kinds of innovation activities. 
Therefore,  any  regulatory  policy  change  intended  to  promote  innovation  should  be 
evaluated  against  different  types  of  competition.  Stimulating  competition  could 
probably be more effective if specific types of competition  were taken into account or 
aimed for. Of course, this first demands much more elaborated work to identify relevant   25 
competitive  forces,  their  connection  with  the  types  of  innovation  and  contingency 
factors that moderate these relationships.  
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